Monthly Archives: August 2017

Surujpaul called Dick v Reginam

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  • Privy Council – British Guiana – Criminal law – Accessory before the fact – One accused found guilty as accessory before the fact, but all accused acquitted as principals – Whether conviction of the one sustainable – Criminal Law (Offences) Ordinance (Laws of British Guiana, 1957, c 10), s 24, s 25.
The appellant, together with four others, was charged in one count with the murder of A. One accused was acquitted at the close of the case for the prosecution. Owing to uncertainty who were present at the time when A was killed, the jury were asked with regard to each of the other accused whether they found him guilty or not guilty of being an accessory before the fact to murder or guilty or not guilty as principal. All accused were acquitted save the appellant, who was found guilty of being an accessory before the fact to the murder of A, but was found not guilty as principal. The appellant had made a statement to the police in which he had said that two of the accused, other than himself, had shot A.

Held – The conviction of the appellant of being an accessory before the fact to murder must be quashed because it was inconsistent with the acquittals of all accused of murder, there being no sufficient evidence to have enabled the jury to have concluded as against the appellant that one or more of the accused had committed the murder.

[there’s no sufficient evidence as to the actual commission of the crime, but only as to the existence of the plot; and that the appellant cannot “confess” as to the acts of other persons which he has not seen and of which he can only have knowledge by hearsay]

R v Hughes ((1860), Bell, CC 242) and R v Rowley ([1948] 1 All ER 570) considered.

[R v Hughes can be distinguished on the ground that although in Hughes the principal was acquitted, there was sufficient evidence to establish the commission of the crime (being the principal’s own confession), in this case there’s no sufficient evidence]

Appeal allowed.

Cases referred to in opinion

R v Hughes (1860), Bell, CC 242, 29 LJMC 71, 1 LT 450, 24 JP 101, 14 Digest (Repl) 108, 726.

R v Rowley [1948] 1 All ER 570, 112 JP 207, 32 Cr App Rep 147, 14 Digest (Repl) 112, 775.

Appeal

Appeal in forma pauperis by special leave by Surujpaul called Dick against a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana (Stoby Ag CJ, Luckhoo and Date JJ), dated 8 January 1958, dismissing the appellant’s appeal from his conviction on 29 July 1957, at the Criminal Assizes for the County of Berbice in British Guiana before Phillips J sitting with a jury, of being an accessory before the fact to the murder of Claude Allen, a police constable, on 9 March 1957. The appellant was sentenced to death. The facts appear in the judgment of the Board.

W P Grieve for the appellant.

J G Le Quesne for the Crown.

2 October 1958. The following opinion was delivered.

The appellant was convicted at the criminal assizes for the County of Berbice in British Guiana on 29 July 1957, of being an accessory before the fact to the murder of Claude Allen and was sentenced to death. His appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana was dismissed on 8 January 1958. He appealed in forma pauperis by special leave to Her Majesty in Council, and this appeal was heard by the Board on 22, 23, 24 July 1958.

[1958] 3 All ER 300 at 301

The appellant was charged with four other men in one count with the murder of Claude Allen on 9 March 1957. The other four men will be referred to as accused Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5. At the end of the case for the prosecution, accused No 2 was, on the direction of the trial judge, acquitted by the jury. Owing to uncertainty as to which, if any, of the remaining accused was actually present and taking part in the murder and which, if any, might have been accessories before the fact, the jury were quite properly asked with regard to each accused whether they found him guilty or not guilty of being accessory before the fact to murder, and whether they found him guilty or not guilty as principal. They found the accused guilty as an accessory before the fact to murder and not guilty as principal, accused Nos 3, 4 and 5 they found not guilty as accessories and not guilty as principals. The appellant contended that these verdicts were contradictory and inconsistent and, accordingly, his conviction should be quashed. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected this contention on the ground that the jury must have come to the conclusion on the evidence legally admissible against the appellant that he was accessory before the fact to murder committed by the other accused, although they were not satisfied on the evidence legally admissible against each of the other accused considered separately that the Crown had discharged the burden of proving the guilt of any one of them.

Section 24 and s 25 of the Criminal Law (Offences) Ordinance, c 10 of the Laws of British Guiana, are as follows:

“24. Everyone who becomes an accessory before the fact to any felony, whether it is a felony at common law or by virtue of any statute for the time being in force, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were a principal felon.

“25. Everyone who counsels, procures, or commands any other person to commit any felony, whether it is a felony at common law or by virtue of any statute for the time being in force, shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted, either as an accessory before the fact to the principal felony together with the principal felon, or after the conviction of the principal felon, or may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon has or has not been previously convicted, or is or is not amenable to justice, and may thereupon be punished in the same manner as any accessory before the fact to the same felony, if convicted as an accessory, may be punished.”

These sections are for all practical purposes identical with s 1 and s 2 of the English Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, which in their turn had previously appeared respectively in the Acts of 1848a and 1826b.

a     See the Criminal Procedure Act, 1848, s 1 (repealed)

b     See the Criminal Law Act, 1826, s 9 (repealed)

It may be convenient at this stage to refer to a passage in Russell on Crime (11th Edn), Vol 1, at pp 134 and 135 which shortly and accurately states the nature of this crime. It is as follows:

“A simple but important point is sometimes overlooked, namely, that when the law relating to principals and accessories as such is under consideration there is only one crime, although there may be more than one person criminally liable in respect of it; if there are more than one person, then the question arises as to the category in which each one is to be placed, that is, whether he is accessory before the fact, or principal in the first or second degree or an accessory after the fact. There is one crime, and that it has been committed must be established before there can be any question of criminal guilt of participation in it. It is true that one who procures, advises, solicits or instigates in any way another person to commit a crime is himself guilty of the common law misdemeanour of incitement whether or not the offence solicited is carried out; but incitement is a different offence from

[1958] 3 All ER 300 at 302

the one which is solicited; if and when the latter offence is committed then, and not until then, the inciter becomes a party to it, and if it be a felony, he is classed as an accessory before the fact, the fact being the crime which the incited person, has, in the character of principal in the first degree, carried out.”

In the present case, it was essential to the conviction of any one of the accused as accessory before the fact for the Crown to prove that he had counselled, procured or commanded one or more of the other accused persons to murder Claude Allen, and that such person or persons had in fact murdered the said Allen. By their verdict, the jury have found that murder by any one of the accused has not been proved, but that none the less the appellant was guilty of having counselled one or more of them to commit murder and that one or more of them, unspecified, in fact committed it. This certainly appears, at first sight at any rate, an inconsistent and contradictory verdict.

In the course of the argument, their Lordships were referred to several authorities, some dealing with the law as to conspiracy, which was said to be analogous for present purposes, and to the history and origins of the law with regard to principals and accessories, but it is sufficient to refer to the only two cases which really throw much light on the present question.

The first is R v Hughes ((1860), Bell, CC 242). This was a case reserved by the Recorder of Manchester for the opinion of the Court of Queen’s Bench. The prisoner Hughes had been charged together with one Hall in the first two counts of the indictment with larceny and in the third count alone with receiving. Both prisoners pleaded not guilty and were put in charge of the jury, whereupon counsel for the prosecution intimated that he did not propose to offer any evidence against Hall and applied that he should be acquitted in order that he might be called as a witness for the prosecution against Hughes. The recorder acceded to this request and Hall was acquitted. He was called as a witness and testified that he had stolen the goods in question and sold or given them to Hughes. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty against Hughes. The question reserved for the court was (ibid, at p 245):

“Whether, as the facts showed that Hughes, if guilty at all of the larceny, was guilty only as an accessory before the fact, and Hall, the principal, having been acquitted, I ought not to have told the jury that Hughes was entitled to his acquittal on the counts for larceny, and that they were to confine their attention to the count for receiving only.”

The judgment of the court was delivered by Erle CJ. He said (ibid, at p 248) that the Criminal Procedure Act, 1848, s 1, had made the crime of being an accessory a substantive felony, and that the old law which made the conviction of the principal felon a condition precedent to the conviction of the accessory had been done away with. He added that the accessory, “whether he is tried before or at the same time as the principal … may be found guilty”, although the principal be acquitted. In the report of this case in 1 LT 450 at p 452, instead of the words italicised above the sentence reads:

“Whether the principal be tried before or at some time after the accessory before the fact, still there may be guilt in the accessory.”

The variation is, perhaps, of little importance since, in the case with which the court was dealing, the principal had been acquitted on the same indictment and by the same jury, albeit the acquittal of the principal was reached in the absence of any evidence of the commission of the felony, whereas there was ample evidence of such commission in the evidence adduced on the trial of Hughes.

The second and more recent case is R v Rowley ([1948] 1 All ER 570). In this case, the appellant had been charged at Birmingham City Quarter Sessions in one count together with two other men with breaking and entering and stealing, and in a second count together with the other two with receiving. In a further

[1958] 3 All ER 300 at 303

count the appellant was charged alone as an accessory after the fact to the felonious receiving by the other two. At the trial, the appellant’s plea on this last count was taken first. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced. The trial of the other two men proceeded and they were acquitted on all counts. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal (Lord Goddard CJ Humphreys and Singleton JJ), counsel for the Crown conceded that the procedure adopted had been quite irregular. Humphreys J in delivering the judgment of the court quashing the conviction said (ibid, at p 571):

“As a result, there is error on the record which cannot be cured by amendment. Writs of error are abolished and have been abolished since 1908 by the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, but this court has the power which the Court of King’s Bench used to exercise in dealing with error on the record. Where there are no means of amending the record so as to make it consonant with the proved facts of the case and where it is inconsistent with itself, as the record is here, the only course this court can take is to quash the conviction … “

The judgment then proceeded to comment on the undesirability of the course which had been adopted at the trial of taking the plea of the accessory before the trial of the principal felons.

It is to be observed that R v Hughes was not cited to the court, and it is true that counsel for the Crown did not seek to support the conviction. None the less, whatever the true view may be with regard to the technicalities, the course which had been adopted by the Recorder of Manchester in the last-mentioned case would now be regarded with even greater disapproval than that of the assistant recorder of Birmingham in R v Rowley.

Their Lordships do not consider it necessary in this case to decide whether writ of error would have lain by reason of error on the record which could not be cured by reference to the evidence. They are content to deal with the case on the basis on which counsel for the Crown sought to uphold the conviction, namely, by looking at the evidence to see if the inconsistency on the record is real or only apparent. The case for the Crown was that the accused men had engaged in a plot to rob the overseer of an estate of the wages of the estate workers, and that, on 9 March 1957, Walter Cameron, the overseer, was in a land rover driven by a man named Ashroof together with a police escort, Claude Allen, near a place called New Dam, when two of the accused wearing masks and armed with a stick and a double barrelled shotgun held them up. Cameron threw the wages to the man with a stick, a shot from the rear of the vehicle was fired and Allen was wounded. Five masked men were seen running away, and Allen died later in the day.

The case for the prosecution rested largely on the evidence of a man named Dhajoo, whom the jury were rightly told to treat as an accomplice. His evidence went to prove the existence of a plot by the accused to rob the payroll and to make use of masks and to hide guns in preparation for the robbery. If believed, there could be little doubt of the existence of the plot, and there was material in all the circumstances from which they might have drawn the inference that the plan was carried out by all or some of the accused and that, in the course thereof, the murder was committed. But the jury, whatever they may have thought with regard to the evidence of the plot, evidently did not consider it sufficient to warrant the conviction of any of the accused as a principal. But it is said on behalf of the Crown that, as against the appellant, they may have found something in his statement to the police which would amount, with Dhajoo’s evidence, to sufficient evidence and admissible against him that the crime was committed by one or more of those who had been “counselled or procured” by the appellant so to do. This necessitates a close examination of the statement, but it may here be observed that, although such statement may afford very strong corroboration of Dhajoo’s evidence with regard to the part taken by the appellant in the plot

[1958] 3 All ER 300 at 304

and as to his counselling or inciting the others to commit robbery or murder, it is difficult to see how it can afford any evidence as to the actual commission of the crime at which, by their verdict, the jury have found he was not proved to have been present and assisting. A voluntary statement made by an accused person is admissible as a “confession”. He can confess as to his own acts, knowledge or intentions, but he cannot “confess” as to the acts of other persons which he has not seen and of which he can only have knowledge by hearsay. A failure by the prosecution to prove an essential element in the offence cannot be cured by an “admission” of this nature.

The passage in the statement of the appellant relied on by the Crown is as follows:

“When Chandee [No. 2 accused] came back Sunday morning 10.3.57 about five o’clock, he and Jagolall [No. 5] begin to gaff, and Jagolall ask Chandee why he shoot the man, and Chandee say when I say stick it up the man put he hand pon the revolver foh draw am out, and then Chandee and Battle Boy [No. 4] shoot am.”

A statement of this nature cannot, in their Lordships’ opinion, be regarded as equivalent to evidence by witnesses of the acts spoken to in this conversation and as sufficient to warrant as against the appellant a finding that Chandee (No 2), and/or Battle Boy (No 4), both of whom the jury acquitted, in fact committed the murder.

Their Lordships find it difficult to believe that, in any event, the jury applied this process of reasoning in arriving at their verdict. They consider it much more likely that the jury failed to appreciate the distinction between incitement to murder or conspiracy and being an accessory before the fact, and that the passage in the trial judge’s summing-up dealing with the appellant’s case may have contributed to this result. He said:

“If you feel sure that the evidence does not prove that he was there on the dam, but that he conspired with others to rob this payroll money and to commit this crime of robbery with violence with loaded guns, then you may convict him of the offence of being an accessory before the fact to murder.”

In so saying, their Lordships do not desire to be unduly critical of the learned trial judge’s summing-up taken as a whole. This was a most difficult and troublesome case to deal with and was not made easier for judge or jury by the numerous objections which were taken at various stages, none of which is now relied on.

Whatever may have actuated the jury in coming to these inconsistent verdicts, their Lordships are satisfied on an examination of the evidence that there was no distinction with regard to the evidence relating to the commission of the substantive offence as between the appellant and the other accused which could justify the result arrived at.

Their Lordships have, accordingly, humbly advised Her Majesty that this appeal be allowed, the verdict against and sentence on the appellant be quashed and a verdict of not guilty entered.

Solicitors: Lawrence Jones & Co (for the appellant); Charles Russell & Co (for the Crown).

G A Kidner Esq Barrister.

Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd

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CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST, LTD. v. HIGH TREES HOUSE, LTD.

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

[1947] KB 130, [1956] 1 All ER 256, [1946] WN 175

HEARING-DATES: 18 July 1946 18 July 1946

Estoppel — Estoppel in pais — Estoppel by conduct — Lease of flats — Written promise to reduce rent owing to war- time conditions — No consideration — Reduced rent paid — Binding effect of promise — Effect of ending of war-time conditions.

Landlord and Tenant — Rent — Reduction of rent — Lease of flats — Written promise to reduce rent owing to war- time conditions — No consideration — Reduced rent paid — Binding effect of promise — Effect of ending of war-time conditions.

HEADNOTE:

Landlords let a new block of flats in 1937 to H. Ltd. (called “the tenants”), on a ninety-nine years’ lease at a ground rent of £ 2,500 a year. Few of the flats had been let at the outbreak of war in 1939, and, in view of the tenants’ difficulty in paying the rent out of profits in prevailing conditions, the landlords agreed in writing in 1940 to reduce the rent to £ 1,250. No duration of the reduction of rent was specified and there was no consideration for it. The tenants paid the reduced rent. By early in 1945 the whole block of flats was let. On Sept. 21, 1945, the landlords wrote asking that the full rent of £ 2,500 should be paid and claiming arrears of £ 7,916. They subsequently brought a test action to recover the balance of rent for the quarters ending Sept. 29 and Dec. 25, 1945.

Held: (i) the promise of a reduction of rent, being intended to be legally binding and to be acted on, and having been acted on by the tenants, was binding on the landlords to the extent that they would not be allowed to act inconsistently with it, although it was not the subject of estoppel at common law; but

(ii) the promise was for a reduction of rent which was temporary and was to endure so long only as the block of flats was not substantially let, and, since the block of flats was substantially let early in 1945, the landlords were entitled to the full rent for the quarters ending Sept. 29 and Dec. 25, 1945.

INTRODUCTION:

Action. The landlords let a block of flats to the tenants on a ninety-nine years’ lease under seal in 1937 at a ground rent of £ 2,500, which in view of war-time conditions and without consideration they agreed in writing in 1940 to reduce to £ 1,250. Early in 1945 the flats became fully occupied and in September, 1945, the landlords claimed that rent was payable at the full rate of £ 2,500 and they also claimed arrears in respect of earlier years. They brought a test action for the recovery of the full rent for the two quarters ending on Sept. 29, 1945, and Dec. 25, 1945. The tenants contended that the reduced rent was payable for the whole term of the lease, or alternatively that it was payable up to September, 1945, on the ground that the landlords were estopped from now claiming the additional rent or alternatively that they were bound by their promise of a reduction in the rent, which was made with the intention that it should be binding and should be acted on and which was, in fact, acted on by the tenants.

COUNSEL:

Robert Fortune for the landlords. Ronald Hopkins for the tenants.

PANEL: Denning, J.

JUDGMENT:

DENNING, J.: On Sept. 27, 1937, Central London Property Trust, Ltd., the landlords, let a block of flats to High Trees House, Ltd., the tenants, for a term of ninety-nine years from Sept. 29, 1937, at a rent of £ 2,500 a year, the lease being by deed and properly executed. Those two companies were closely linked. The plaintiffs held all the shares of the defendant company (the tenants) and they were linked by directors and secretaries.

This new block of flats had not been fully occupied by the beginning of the war in 1939 owing to the absence of people from London; I think only one-third of it had been let by the outbreak of war. With war conditions prevailing, it was plain to those who ran these companies that the rent payable under the lease could not be paid out of the profits. In those circumstances, as a result of discussions, an arrangement was made between the directors concerned, which was put into writing. On Jan. 3, 1940, the landlords wrote to the tenants in these terms:

“We confirm the arrangement made between us by which the ground rent should be reduced as from the commencement of the lease to £ 1,250 per annum”;
and at a meeting of the plaintiff company (the landlords) in April, 1940, the resolution was confirmed that the tenants be charged ground rent from Mar. 1, 1939, at the reduced rate of £ 1,250 a year in place of the £ 2,500 a year provided in the lease.

I am satisfied that that arrangement was intended simply as a temporary expedient to deal with the exceptional conditions then prevailing, under which the block of flats was only partially let. The arrangement had no reference to events in which the block of flats was wholly let, if they subsequently occurred. Indeed, having regard to the close connection between these two companies, I do not suppose anything would have come before the courts but for the fact that in March, 1941, the debenture-holders of the plaintiff company (the landlords) appointed a receiver, by whom the affairs of the landlords have since been managed.

Before and after his appointment the tenants paid the reduced rent of £ 1,250 a year; in one bad year they could not pay even that, but paid a smaller amount. Otherwise £ 1,250 a year was paid in 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944. Even when the premises were fully let, at the beginning of 1945, the reduced rent of £ 1,250 was paid. The receiver had not looked into the lease, or realised what the rent was. Only in September, 1945, did he realise that the rent reserved was £ 2,500 a year. Accordingly, on Sept. 21, 1945, he wrote to the tenants saying that the £ 2,500 a year must be paid, and also arrears, which he says are £ 7,916.

No payment being received, he brings this action to test the position in law. It concerns two periods, which provide a critical test of the rights of the parties. Rent is claimed of £ 625 for the quarter ending Sept. 29, 1945, and also of £ 625 for the quarter ending Dec. 25, 1945.

The tenants said first that the reduction of £ 1,250 was to apply throughout the term of ninety-nine years, and that the reduced rent was payable during the whole of that time. Alternatively, they said that was payable up to Sept. 24, 1945, when the increased rent would start.

If I consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law there is no doubt that the whole claim must succeed. This is a lease under seal, and at common law, it could not be varied by parol or by writing, but only by deed; but equity has stepped in, and the courts may now give effect to a variation in writing (see Berry v. Berry (1), [1929] 2 K.B. 316). That equitable doctrine could hardly apply, however, in this case because this variation might be said to be without consideration.

As to estoppel, this representation with reference to reducing the rent was not a representation of existing fact, which is the essence of common law estoppel; it was a representation in effect as to the future — a representation that the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. At common law, that would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money (2) (1854) (5 H.L. Cas. 185), a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing. So at common law it seems to me there would be no answer to the whole claim.

What, then, is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still even since Jorden v. Money (2). There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such. They are cases of promises which were intended to create legal relations and which, in the knowledge of the person making the promise, were going to be acted on by the party to whom the promise was made, and have in fact been so acted on. In such cases the courts have said these promises must be honoured. There are certain cases to which I particularly refer: Fenner v. Blake (3) ([1900] 1 Q.B. 426), Re Wickham (4) (1917) (34 T.L.R. 158), Re William Porter & Co., Ltd. (5) ([1937] 2 All E.R. 361) and Buttery v. Pickard (6) (1946) (174 L.T. 144). Although said by the learned judges who decided them to be cases of estoppel, all these cases are not estoppel in the strict sense. They are cases of promises which were intended to be binding, which the parties making them knew would be acted on and which the parties to whom they were made did act on. Jorden v. Money (2) can be distinguished because there the promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be said to be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for breach of such promises, but they have refused to allow the party making them to act inconsistently with them. It is in that sense, and in that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The cases are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity; for the cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (7) (1877) (2 App. Cas. 439), Birmingham & District Land Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. (8) (1888) (40 Ch.D. 268), and Salisbury v. Gilmore (9) ([1942] 1 All E.R. 457), show that a party will not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. The time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognised. The logical consequence, no doubt, is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted on, is binding, notwithstanding the absence of consideration, and if the fusion of law and equity leads to that result, so much the better. At this time of day it is not helpful to try to draw a distinction between law and equity. They have been joined together now for over seventy years, and the problems have to be approached in a combined sense.

It is to be noticed that in the sixth interim report of the Law Revision Committee, it was recommended that such a promise as I have referred to should be enforceable in law even though no consideration had been given by the promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned, that has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts.

I am satisfied that such a promise is binding in law, and the only question is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on the evidence that the promise was that the ground rent should be reduced to £ 1,250 a year as a temporary expedient, while the block of flats was not fully or substantially fully let owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that this reduction of rent applied up to the end of 1944. But early in 1945 the flats were fully let and the rents received from them (many were not caught by the Rent Restrictions Acts) had been increased more than originally anticipated. At all events the revenue from them must have been very considerable. The conditions prevailing when the reduction was made had completely passed away, as I find, by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply in the conditions prevailing at the time of the flats being partially let, and the promise did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let early in 1945 the reduction ceased to apply.

In those circumstances under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that the quarter’s rents are fully payable for the quarter ending Sept. 29, 1945, and the quarter ending Dec. 25, 1945, which are the amounts claimed in this action.

If it had been a case of estoppel, it might have been said that the estoppel in any event would end with the ending of the conditions to which the representation applied, or alternatively only on notice. But in either case it is only a way of asking what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that the promise, intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply.It is binding as covering the period down to early 1945, and from that time full rent is payable. I therefore give judgment for the amount claimed, credit to be given for the £ 275 paid and accepted.

DISPOSITION:

Judgment for the landlords.

SOLICITORS:

Henry Boustred & Sons (for the landlords); Callingham, Griffith & Bate (for the tenants).