Monthly Archives: June 2018

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LIABILITY

  1. “safe system” – English v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1938] AC 57 -> Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd v Wong Sau Lai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 371
  2. traffic accident – “agony of the moment” – Chu Fung Ping v Wong Wai Leung (HCPI 420/2014, unrep., Deputy Judge Cooney SC, 28 July 2017)
  3. lift accident – Kong Lin Fat Johnny v The Incorporated Owners of Chang Pao Ching Building & Anor (DCPI 1580/2010, unrep., Deputy District Court Judge Stanley Siu, 12 September 2014)
  4. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] 1 AC 1430
  5. medical negligence – anaesthetist – Frank Yu Yu Kai v Chan Chi Keung (2009) 12 HKCFAR 705
  6. medical negligence – loss of chance – Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2; Wright (A Child) v Cambridge Medical Group (A Partnership) [2011] EWCA Civ 669 (09 June 2011)
  7. wrongful life – Lam Wing Hei (a minor suing by her mother and next friend Lam Tsz Kiu) & Anor v Hospital Authority [2018] 2 HKLRD 1441
  8. the tort of scienter – 王鉄英 訴 方展禹及另一人 [2006] 3 HKLRD 547
  9. vicarious liability – Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670 (17 July 2018)

QUANTUM

  1. restitutio ad integrum – “[damages are] that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting compensation or reparation” per Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39
  2. unliquidated vs liquidated damages
  3. general vs special damages – Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130
  4. itemisation
  5. PSLA – (i) pain; (ii) suffering (iii) loss of amenities
  6. the Lee Ting Lam [1980] HKLR 657 categories as a “cross-check” – Chan Yuk v Dragages et Travaux Publics (HK) Ltd [2000] 3 HKLRD 1, para. 16
  7. conventional nature of non-pecuniary damages – e.g. per Lloyd LJ in Alsford v British Telecommunications plc (1986) CA, 30 October 1986 [“Everybody accepts that awards of damages in this field are necessarily conventional, and that they are based on a scale of comparative seriousness which is also conventional. I do not suggest that the scale is immutable. It may change gradually over time, as indeed may the level of damages generally. If judges consistently award damages move up the scale of relative seriousness. But in my judgment not be open to a judge to award damages outside the range because he regards as being too low”] – c.f. Lord Scarman’s speech in Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 189 [rejecting the defendant’s submisison the PSLA award should be greatly reduced on the basis that the issue had been settled by previous House of Lords authority – “We are in the area of “conventional awards” for non-pecuniary loss, where comparability matters. Justice requires that such awards continue to be consistent with the general level accepted by the judges. If the law is to be changed… it should be not judicially but legislatively within the context of a comprehensive enactment dealing with all the aspects of damages of personal injury”] – Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 [per Lord Clyde – “In respect of pain and suffering money can only be a conventional medium of compensation and the assessment of it to cover the past and the future must necessarily be imprecise and open to differences of view. But the accumulation of precedent and experience and the careful analysis of the nature and effects of particular injuries can go a long way towards establishing levels of award which may be generally recognised and accepted as reasonable in particular circumstances. If necessary those levels may be open to adjustment or even correction from time to time by those courts which are best qualified to review what must in essence be a factual assessment of the kind sometimes referred to as a jury question”]
  8. interest fixed at 2% a year by the House of Lords in Birkett v Hayes [1982] 1 WLR 816; [1982] 2 All ER 70. This was confirmed as appropriate by the Court of Appeal in Lawrence v Chief Constable of Staffordshire [2000], The Times, 25 July.
  9. PSLA & Inflation
  10. Disaster Category (see previous research note)
  11. the forensic nature of pre-trial loss vs the crystal-ball-gazing nature of post-trial loss – Lai Jianxing v Sakoma (HK) Ltd & Ors [2011] 5 HKLRD 329, paras. 40-41
  12. “loss” – nominal income or income net of tax? restitutio ad integrum – British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185
  13. loss of earnings – illegal earnings not allowed – Chung Sui Cheong the administrator of the estate of Chung Wai Man Joseph Deceased v Tsang Wai Hung (HCPI 1058/2015, unrep., Wilson Chan J, 3 November 2017)
  14. pre-trial vs post-trial loss – no deduction is made for contingencies – Pritchard v JH Cobden Ltd & Anor [1988] Fam 22 [“Loss of earnings between the date of the accident, when the cause of action accrued, and the date of trial have always been claimed as special damages. Since the decision of the House of Lords in British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185, it is the loss of wages net of income ta that has to be ascertained. This has always been done as a straight calculation and no one has suggested that, when the total figure has been ascertained as best the court can in an individual case, any deduction should be made for the mere chance that during that period the plaintiff might not have earned his wages because, for example, he might have fallen ill or lost his job and been unable to get one as remunerative as the one that he held“]
  15. reason for all the fuss with post-trial loss – the lump sum approach – Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 182 [per Lord Scarman: “The course of the litigation illustrates, with devastating clarity, the insuperable problems implicit in a system of compensation for personal injuries which (unless the parties agree otherwise) can yield only a lump sum assessed by the court at the time of judgement… The award, which covers past, present, and future injury and loss, must, under our law, be of a lump sum assessed at the conclusion of the legal process. The award is final; it is not susceptible to review as the future unfolds, substituting fact for estimate. Knowledge of the future being denied to mankind, so much of the award as is to be attributed to future loss and suffering – in many cases the major part of the award – will almost surely be wrong. There is really only one certainty: the future will prove the award to be either too high or too low“]; also Chan Pak Ting v Chan Chi Kuen & Anor [2013] 1 HKLRD 634 at para. 5 – LRC’s Consultation Paper on Periodical Payments for Future Pecuniary Loss
  16. annuity approach – multiplicand/multiplier model – per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Hodgson v Trapp [1989] AC 807 at 826: “Essentially what the court has to do is to calculate as best it can the sum of money which will on the one hand be adequate, by its capital and income, to provide annually for the injured person a sum equal to his estimated annual loss over the whole of the period during which that loss is likely to continue, but which, on the other hand, will not, at the end of that period, leave him in a better financial position than he would have bee apart from the accident. Hence the conventional approach is to assess the amount notionally required to be laid out in the purchase of an annuity which will provide the annual amount needed for the whole period of loss”
  17. multiplicand – future inflationary changes are not to be taken into account – Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174. So, the multiplicand will
    adopt the monthly earnings as at notional date of trial; But if there is evidence to indicate that, but for the Accident, there is a real prospect for the plaintiff to be promoted at work, then the multiplicand can be calculated taking into account any salary raise as a result of the promotion: Lam Pui Yi Anita v Secretary for Justice [2011] 1 HKLRD 56.
  18. multiplicand – if a plaintiff is too young to be employed, the court must make the best possible estimate on what career the child would have pursued ad use that estimate to calculate future earnings. This is the case even for a very young child, as demonstrated in the Privy Council case of Jamil bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah [1984] AC 529
  19. multiplier – function of the multiplier – per Hobhouse J in Wilett v North Bedfordshire Health Authority [1993] PIQR Q166 at 167, “The function of the multiplier of an annual sum is first to convert one or more annual sums, that is, items of expenditure, into a single capital sum. It is, secondly, to allow for the advancement of the payment or payments that are being made. It is, thirdly, to allow for contingencies and other adjusting factors that have to be taken into account.”
  20. multiplier – possibility of having different discount rates for earning-based loss and non-earning-based loss – Chan Pak Ting v Chan Chi Kuen & Anor (No. 2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1 [“39. In my judgment, the difference of 0.43% is not significant enough for me to set two Discount Rates. I find, having regard to current economic conditions, that the current small difference is likely to persist, at least in the near term. However, this issue must be revisited if changes in the economy produce a difference between wage inflation and price inflation that approaches or exceeds 1%.“]
  21. multiplier – Ogden Tables – now a starting point – Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 [per Lord Lloyd, at 379F-G, “I do not suggest that the judge should be a slave to the tables. There may well be special factors in particular cases. But the tables should now be regarded as a starting-point, rather than a check. A judge should be slow to depart from the relevant actuarial multiplier on impressionistic grounds, or by reference to ‘a spread of multipliers in comparable cases’ especially when the multiplier were fixed before the actuarial tables were widely used”] – CAVEAT: possibility to deviate from the tables to cater for individual circumstances recognised in Biesheuvel v Birrell [1999] PIQR Q40 [where Eady J started with a multiplier arrived at by applying a 3% rate of return but provided for a substantial uplift on account of the incidence of tax in the Netherlands, where the plaintiff would stay, at Q48] – but in Van Oudenhoven v Griffin Inns Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1413, Stuart-Smith LJ warned against the pitfall of finding an exceptional case by the mere fact that the plaintiff would be subject to Dutch tax
  22. multiplier – Ogden Tables – admissible under s. 10(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 in the UK – no equivalent in HK – widely adduced and adopted as a matter of judicial practice instead
  23. multiplier – development in UK – Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556 [a 4.5% return from investment in equities] -> Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 [the injured person should not be forced to take unnecessary risks such as that attendant upon investment in equities in order to achiever a higher rate of return; the following should be taken into account: (a) injured persons have little control over, for instance, when the expenses for care are to be incurred, which means a fair degree of liquidity is required; (b) investment vehicles with long and inflexible maturity period will not be suitable; (c) injured persons, who normally have no other means of subsistence, are not well-placed to absorb the risk of investment loss, particularly, where they may be forced to absorb such loss by depleting the capital; rather, the following assumptions are made: (a) a hypothetical claimant would invest only in ILGS and would hold them until maturity; (b) the return was assessed on the 3-year average of all ILGS; (c) ILGS with maturity not exceeding 5 years were excluded; (d) inflation was estimated at 5% and Standard Tax Rate of 25% was taken into account] -> the Damages (Personal Injury) Order 2001 by Lord Irvine (Lord Chancellor) on 25 June 2001 pursuant to s. 1(1) of the Damages Act 1996 setting the discount rate at 2.5% -> Simon v Helmot (Guernsey) [2012] UKPC 5 [upholding the Court of Appeal’s decisions that (a) it is no longer realistic to follow the 2.5% discount rate under the 2001 order; (b) the starting position is that the gross return is only about 1%; due to the higher rate of inflation of wages, a discount rate of -1.5% should be applied for earning-based losses and 0.5% for non-earning-based losses]
  24. multiplier – development in HK – Chan Pui Ki v Leung On & Anor [1996] 2 HKLRD 401 -> Chan Pak Ting v Chan Chi Kuen & Anor [2013] 1 HKLRD 634 & (No. 2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1 [Commentaries on Hong Kong Lawyer – Part 1; Part 2; Commentaries by Deacons] – Simon v Helmot (Guernsey) [2012] UKPC 5 considered – affirmed in Chan Wai Ming v Leung Shing Wah [2014] 4 HKLRD 669
  25. multiplier – how the plaintiff actually invests the damages is irrelevant [per Lord Clyde in Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 at 394H-395B “Whether he is proposing to invest it or spend it, or, more particularly, exactly how he is going to invest it or spend it, does not affect the calculation of the award. No distinction is recognised here between misers and spendthrifts. While it may be evident that there are certain ways in which he could prudently invest the award in other ways in which he could be impairing his own future comfort by his employment of the award, the quantification of the sum to which he is entitled in compensation takes no account of the course which he may in the event choose to adopt.” – cited by Bharwaney J in Chan Pak Ting (No. 2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1, para. 75] – the fact that insurance premium will go up due to downward adjustment of the discount rate (resulting in higher multiplier) should not affect the plaintiff’s entitlement to full compensation [per Lord Hutton  in Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 at 405D-F “The consequence of the present judgments of this House will be a very substantial rise in the level of awards to plaintiffs who by reason of the negligence of others sustain very grave injuries requiring nursing care in future years and causing a loss of future earning capacity, and there will be resultant increases in insurance premiums. But under the present principles of law governing the assessment of damages which provide that injured persons should receive full compensation plaintiffs are entitled to such increased awards. If the law is to be changed it can only be done by Parliament which, unlike the judges, is in a position to balance the many social, financial and economic factors which would have to be considered if such a change were contemplated” – cited by Bharwaney J in Chan Pak Ting (No. 2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1, para. 140]
  26. post-trial loss – multiplicand/multiplier model – crystal ball gazing using evidence about the past – not an exact science – the speech of Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Hodgson v Trapp [1989] AC 807 at 833C [“There are, I think, four considerations which have to be borne in mind at the outset. First and foremost is the fact that the exercise upon which the court has to embark is one which is inherently unscientific and in which expert evidence can be of only the most limited assistance. Average life expectations can be actuarially ascertained, but to assess the probabilities of future political, economic and fiscal policies requires not the services of an actuary or an accountant but those of a prophet“] – see also Chan Pui Ki v Leung On & Anor [1996] 2 HKLRD 401; Simon v Helmot (Guernsey) [2012] UKPC 5, para. 113
  27. multiplier – split – Ali Mehboob v Yuk Kwan Construction Engineering Ltd & Anor (unrep., HCPI 1370/2014, Recorder Winnie Tam SC, 3 May 2018)
  28. loss of earning capacity – Smith v Manchester Corp [1974] EWCA Civ 6 – Moaliker v A Reyrolle & Co Limited [1977] 1 W.L.R. 132; Chan Wai Tong v Li Ping Sum [1985] HKLRD 176 (PC) [local adaptation; Lord Fraser described the claim for damages under this head as follows: “A claim for loss of future earning capacity usually arises where the claimant is in employment at the time when the claim falls to be evaluated. The claim is cover the risk that, at some future date during the claimant’s working life, he will lose his employment and will then suffer financial loss because of his disadvantage in the labour market. The court has to evaluate the present value of the future risk.”] – in Wong Tang Keung v Lee Wai Engineering Co Ltd [2013] 4 HKLRD 150, the Court of Appeal clarified that this award can be granted for both the pre-trial and the post-trial periods in which the plaintiff suffers such a disadvantage; the relevant factors: Thapa Surendra v E W Cox Hong Kong Ltd (HCPI 451/2009, unrep., Deputy Judge Seagroatt; 11 July 2011) [age, and the time away from the natural retirement; nature of the plaintiff’s injury; (e.g. construction worker suffering from not being able to lift heavy objects is obviously different from civil servant who suffers from back pain); overall condition; the limited type of work which he could carry out; the risk of being unemployed for lengthy periods frequently; and the risk of having to give up work before the normal time simply because he would become unemployable]
  29. loss of earning capacity – too speculative if the injured person is very young – Man Kwok Ngai v Fong Hok Wong & Anor (HCPI 1033/2001, unrep., Seagroatt J, 26 March 2003) [In that case, the claimant was a 7 years old boy. He was injured in an incident in which a large quantity of hot soup was spilt over him. Seagroatt J ruled that the claim for loss of earning capacity was too speculative and refused to award any sum under this head]
  30. future expenses – see an old example in Ta Xuong v The Incorporated Owners of Sun Hing Building [1997] 4 HKC 171; a more recent example in Wok Hoi Wan Irene aka Guo Haiyun suing by her husband and next friend Cheng Yuk Ching v HA (HCPI 261/2011, unrep., Master de Souza, 25 November 2013)
  31. special damages – low standard of proof – as long as more probable than not that such expenses have been occurred & such expenses were reasonable – in the absence of detailed receipts, would make reasonable estimation [For example, Roberts CJ in Yu Ki v Chin Kit-lam & Anor [1981] HKLR 419 at 421, in considering a claim for nourishing food, said: “However, it seems to me to be proper, even in the absence of the necessary evidence required as to the advisability or suitability of the food, to allow a nominal sum, where relatives have spent this on food which the injured person or the relative reasonably believes to be helpful to the plaintiff’s recovery.” See also Chan Si Mui v Kong Hung Keung & Ors (HCA 4977/1991, unrep., Jerome Chan J, 13 September 1994) and Tsang Hing Yuen v Nishimatsu Kumagai Joint Venture (a firm) (HCPI 906/1998, unrep., Suffiad J, 17 March 2000)] – importance of pleading a breakdown – Slater (HCPI 646/2012, unrep., Bharwaney J, 7 July 2017)
  32. special damages – medical expenses – cosmetics – Swift v Carpenter [2018] EWHC 2060 (QB) (06 July 2018)
  33. cost of care – gratuitously care by a relative – to be broadly assessed, not by a “stop-watch” approach – Lai Pui Ling suing by her brother and next friend Lai Hin Ho v Ho Chi Keung & Anor [2016] 3 HKLRD 329
  34. loss of congenial employment – the observation of Deputy Judge Leighton-Williams QC in Lane v Lake [2007] EWCA Crim 970; [2007] All ER (D) 258 at §21: “21. … Mr Gore says such a head of damage is in practice reserved for policemen, firemen and the like. Such awards are frequently made to policemen and firemen but that is because it has become almost a tradition to claim such award in such cases. In my judgment such an award ought to be confined to those who truly have suffered a loss under this head and not be awarded merely by reference to the type of employment nor automatically as an extra.” – cited by Bharwaney J in Slater(HCPI 646/2012, unrep., 7 July 2017)
  35. fatal – development in UK – Claims for Wrongful Death (Report) [1999] EWLC 263; Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2; Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9
  36. fatal – development in HK – overview – Fung Suen Sim v Liu Chun Pong & Anor (HCPI 896/2007, unrep., Bharwaney J, 23 December 2011) – CAVEAT: note that the judgment was pre-Chan Pak Ting; a more recent example in Kan Wai Ling & Fan Mei Na the co-administratrices of the estate of Kan Siu Hong, deceased v Kan Chi Fai (HCPI 232/2011, unrep., Bharwaney J, 9 May 2018)
  37. fatal – causes of action – FAO; LARCO; common law
  38. fatal – common law – claim for pre-trial loss of earnings is possible if period of time between accident and trial is considerable
  39. fatal – FAO – loss of dependency – multiplier – previous approach was to determine the multiplier from the date of death, then deduct from the multiplier the number of years between the date of death and the date of trial – such approached criticised in Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9, where Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale held that the multiplier should be calculated from the date of trial [because the multipliers in the Ogden Tables are calculated with the discount for early and accelerated receipt taken into account – when the previous authorities Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556 and Graham v Dodds [1983] 1 WLR 808 were decided, Ogden tables were not used for calculating multipliers; and the judges in those cases were talking about contingencies instead of early receipt]
  40. fatal – FAO – bereavement – interest at judgment rate – Bushra Bibi v Method Building & Engineering Works Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 402
  41. fatal – claim for diminution in a loss of dependency claim, arising from negligence possible (based on common law)  – Haxton v Philips Electronic UK Limited [2014] 1 WLR 2721
  42. fatal – loss of personal attention and material affection – The basis for this kind of claim seems to be found in Hay v Hughes [1975] QB 790 where Lord Edmund-Davies, having stated the rule that only pecuniary loss was to be awarded for loss of services, went on to say that it might have to be considered whether:- “…it may be argued that the benefit of a mother’s personal attention to a child’s upbringing, morals, education and psychology, which the services of a housekeeper, nurse or governess could never provide, has in the long run a financial value for the child, difficult as it is to assess.”; In Chan Ki v Travel Trade Communication Network and Marketing Services Ltd [1998] 2 HKC 57, Master Cannon made an award for loss of personal attention and maternal affection in favour of 3 adult children in their twenties and one child aged 17 who had lost their mother. They had all lived in family with the mother before her death. The learned Master considered various authorities and awarded $10,000.00 each to the older children and $20,000.00 to the youngest
  43. fatal – loss of service claim only allowed under FAO not LARCO – see e.g. Lee Wai Man v Wah Leung Finance Ltd [2004] 1 HKLRD 1023 at 1044H-J
  44. fatal – “loss years” claim no longer applicable by virtue of LARCO – still applicable in non-fatal cases though
  45. fatal – LARCO – (i) PSLA; (ii) loss of accumulation of wealth; (iii) funeral expenses
  46. fatal – loss of accumulation of wealth – traditionally a lump sum, now the multiplicand/multiplier approach adopted (see e.g. Fung Suen Sim v Liu Chun Pong & Anor, HCPI 896/2007, unrep., Bharwaney J, 23 December 2011) – see previous note.
  47. fatal – loss of accumulation of wealth – Lam Pak Chiu v Tsang Mei Ying (2001) 4 HKCFAR 34 [per Bokhary PJ – pre-death savings pattern not a prerequisite]
  48. fatal – loss of dependency & loss of accumulation of wealth – conventional percentages for maintenance and savings – Harris v Empress Motors [1984] 1 WLR 212 at 216-217  [“In the course of time, the courts have worked out a simple solution to the … problem of calculating the net dependency under the Fatal Accident Acts in cases where the dependants are wife and children. In times past, the calculation called for a tedious enquiry into how much housekeeping money was paid to the wife, who paid how much for the children’s shoes etc. This has all been struck away and the modern practice is to deduct the percentage from the net income figure to represent what the deceased would have spent exclusively on himself. The percentages have become conventional in the sense that they are used unless there is striking evidence to make the conventional figure inappropriate because there is no departure from the principle that each case must be decided on its own facts. Where the family unit was husband and wife, the conventional figure is 33% and the rationale of this is that broadly speaking, the net income was spent as to one-third for the benefit of each and one-third for the joint benefit … Where there are children, the deduction falls to 25%.”]
  49. fatal – apportionment

EVIDENCE

  1. adducing expert report – Fung Chun Man v HA & Anor (HCPI 1113/2006, Bharwaney J, 24 June 2011)
    • whether expert evidence is necessary in a traffic case – generally traffic reconstruction expert evidence is not admissible – Chan Chun Kit v Huen Wai Keung (unrep., HCPI 123/2016, Bharwaney J, 10 May 2017)
  2. the court has the jurisdiction to vary a previous consent order re expert evidence – Wong Man Kin v SfJ (for and on behalf of the Director of Highways) & Anor [2017] 4 HKLRD 412
  3. assessment of credibility of witness – Lee Fu Wing & Anor v Yan Paul Po Ting & Anor [2009] 5 HKLRD 513, para. 53
  4. how to analyse medical reports? Yuen Macie v Yeung Ying Kit (HCPI 528/2015, unrep., Master Leong, 24 November 2016), paras. 67-74; Chu Kwong Fu & Anor v Wonder Gold Investment Ltd (HCPI 295/2014, unrep., Master Leong, 21 May 2015) [GIGO principle; “what was important was the condition of the plaintiff accepted by the court and not how his condition was termed medically”]; Gurung Kamala v Hong Wei Ltd (DCPI 1660/2010, unrep., Deputy District Judge Leong, 26 March 2012) [“78. However, when reading medical documents like records and reports, the court must be aware that it is not the usual duty of the attending doctors (and therapists) to judge whether a patient’s subjective complaints (e.g. pain and tenderness) are truthful or not. A doctor is bound by “doctor-patient trust” and it is not a doctor’s role to “test” the evidence or to “cross-examine” the patient, so as to say, to ascertain their truthfulness.”]
  5. pre-trial loss – sick leave – Tam Fu Yip Fip v Sincere Engineering & Trading Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 210 c.f. Tse Hing Wan v Choy Yuen Keung & Ors (HCPI 889/1998, unrep., Chung J, 24 January 2000) where the Court considered that the treating government doctor should be in a better position to decide the appropriate period of sick leave
  6. post-trial loss – presumption that the injured plaintiff has an average life expectancy and it is for the defendant to prove the contrary – Rowley v London and North Western Railway (1873) LR 8 Ex 221 – reference be made to Hong Kong Life Tables – expert medical evidence normally required to rebut the presumption – Rawlinson v Cooper [2002] EWCA Civ 392
  7. pre-existing conditions – Chan Kam Hoi v Dragages et Traaux Publics [1998] 2 HKLRD 958 [affirming the principles laid down in the first instance judgment HCPI 815/1995, unrep., Deputy Judge Woolley, 7 March 1997)
  8. hearsay evidence Zheng Biao v Kwok Wai Lung & Ors (CACV 241/2004, unrep., 19 May 2005)

PROCEDURE

  1. Leave to serve further witness statements before trial – Gurung An Parsad v Great Wealthy Engineering Co Ltd & Anor [2012] 3 HKLRD 705
  2. Sanctioned Payment – Shih Pik Nog v G2000 (Apparel) Ltd [2011] 4 HKLRD 121; Golden Eagle International (Group) Ltd v GR Investment Holdings Ltd [2010] 3 HKLRD 273
  3. Costs & ECA Fund Board – Kwan Kam Pui v Fung Man & Ors [2014] 6 HKC 361

UNCLASSIFIED & MISCELLANEOUS

  1. LAI KWONG KEE v. HONGKONG UNITED DOCKYARDS LTD [1987] HKCA 24; CACV 129/1987 (16 December 1987)
  2. Churchill Insurance v Charlton [2001] EWCA Civ 112 (2 February 2001)
  3. defect in an Industrial Summons – Hong Kong Lawyer
  4. regulation 38A of the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations, Cap. 59 – Rainfield Design & Associates Ltd v Siu Chi Moon (2000) 3 HKCFAR 134